Bounded by the Nation-State: The OIC and the Question of Palestine

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), established in 1969, has long styled itself as the collective voice of the Muslim world and the institutional embodiment of the ummah. With fifty-seven member states representing nearly 1.8 billion people, about one-quarter of the world’s population, the OIC is the second largest intergovernmental organisation after the United Nations. Its founding charter speaks of being guided by the “noble Islamic values of unity and fraternity”¹ and of safeguarding the dignity and rights of Muslim communities across the globe. From its inception, Palestine was one of the organisation’s primary concerns, with the 1969 arson attack on Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem providing the immediate catalyst for its creation.

Yet, more than half a century later, the OIC’s record on Palestine reveals a striking pattern of rhetorical solidarity coupled with practical inaction. Despite repeated condemnations of Israeli aggression, the organisation has failed to translate its moral pronouncements into meaningful political, diplomatic, or material action. Why has an organisation that claims to represent the collective aspirations of the Muslim world failed to mount an effective response to the ongoing genocide of Palestinians? Why has its engagement remained confined to symbolic resolutions and communiqués, even when the resources of many of its member states far surpass those of Israel?

This article argues that the OIC’s failure is not merely the product of internal divisions or lack of political will, but rather a structural contradiction at the heart of the organisation: it is constituted by modern nation-states, yet it aspires to uphold Islamic values of unity and fraternity. The imperatives of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference inherent to the nation-state system are fundamentally incompatible with the transnational ethic of Islamic solidarity. Consequently, the OIC is trapped in a paradox, an organisation built to transcend borders but bound by them in practice. 

The Origins and Charter of the OIC

The OIC emerged in the aftermath of a symbolic crisis: the arson attack on Al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969 by an Australian tourist. Though the incident was immediately framed as an assault on Islam’s sacred heritage, its deeper resonance lay in the long-standing desire among Muslims to establish a global institution that could replace the political vacuum left by the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924.² By convening its first foreign ministers’ conference in Jeddah in 1970, the OIC sought to institutionalise pan-Islamic solidarity within the structures of the post-World War II international order.² This was a time that followed the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, marking a significant turning point in regional politics. Nasser’s project of Arab nationalism was in decline, and the Arab world was grappling with the implications of its humiliating loss. In the aftermath, Muslim intellectual and political discourse began to shift toward a broader pan-Islamic orientation, moving beyond the earlier emphasis on pan-Arab unity.

Its charter sets out ambitious goals: promoting unity and solidarity among member states; defending the sovereignty and independence of its members; safeguarding the rights of Muslim communities worldwide; and preserving lofty Islamic values such as peace, justice, and dignity. On paper, these aims position the OIC as a moral counterweight to Western-dominated institutions like the UN. In practice, however, the OIC operates firmly within the Westphalian framework of sovereign nation-states. As Dr Ishtiaq Hossain has observed, rather than attempting to transcend the structures of contemporary international relations, the OIC chose to operate within them. This decision has profoundly shaped its capacity or incapacity to act on issues like Palestine.

OIC’s Response to Palestine: Rhetoric without Substance

The OIC has consistently placed Palestine at the top of its agenda. Virtually every summit, ministerial meeting, or extraordinary session produces a statement condemning Israeli aggression and expressing solidarity with the Palestinian people.

Between October 2023 and March 2025, a series of high-level meetings consistently denounced Israel’s actions in Gaza. The Extraordinary Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Jeddah (October 2023) issued a communiqué condemning Israeli brutality,³ followed by the Riyadh Summit (November 2023),⁴ which described Israeli conduct as “war crimes and barbaric, brutal and inhuman massacres,” rejected claims of self-defence, and demanded the lifting of the siege. Similarly, the Istanbul Information Ministers’ Session (February 2024)⁵ decried “systematic oppression, massacre, and genocide,” while the 20th Extraordinary Session (March 2025) again condemned Israeli aggression and displacement schemes.

Such statements reflect moral clarity and rhetorical solidarity. Yet, beyond these communiqués, little has been done. The OIC has not created binding mechanisms to sanction Israel, nor has it mobilised collective economic or political leverage despite the enormous resources of its member states. Unlike the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza war, when the OIC produced a detailed report, the ongoing war since 2023 has not even generated such documentation. Its own Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs has virtually no public record of activity, and individual member states continue bilateral engagements with Israel, especially those bound by the Abraham Accords.

The OIC’s Palestine diplomacy has thus been characterised by repetitive condemnations without follow-through. The organisation has cautioned against “grave consequences,” denounced “heinous massacres,” and declared Israeli crimes as “war crimes and crimes against humanity.” But these statements, however forceful in language, are not accompanied by enforcement mechanisms, collective strategies, or meaningful action.

The Ontological Contradiction: Nation-States vs. Islamic Solidarity

Why has the OIC consistently fallen short? A common explanation is internal division: member states pursue divergent national interests, and wealthy Gulf monarchies in particular have little incentive to antagonise powerful Western allies by taking concrete action against Israel. Another view is realist: international organisations are mere pawns in the hands of powerful states, and the OIC is no exception. A third explanation highlights resource limitations, suggesting that the OIC lacks independent capacity to enforce decisions.

While these factors are valid, they do not fully account for the organisation’s chronic inaction. The deeper problem lies in the OIC’s ontology. As Wael Hallaq (2014) has argued in relation to the idea of an “Islamic state,” the modern state itself is structurally incompatible with Islamic political thought. Defined by sovereignty, territorial integrity, and monopoly of violence, the nation-state prioritises self-interest and security over transnational solidarity. Thus, an organisation composed of nation-states, even if nominally Islamic, cannot embody the ethos of the ummah.

The OIC’s charter illustrates this tension. On the one hand, it declares commitment to unity, fraternity, and Islamic values; on the other, it enshrines principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial integrity. These commitments pull in opposite directions. Upholding sovereignty means respecting national interests, even when those interests conflict with pan-Islamic solidarity. This explains why the OIC has been ineffective not only on Palestine but also on other crises, such as the plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar or the persecution of Muslims in China’s Xinjiang (East Turkistan) region. In short, the OIC embodies a contradiction: it aspires to be the political voice of the ummah, but it is structurally bound by the logic of nation-states. This contradiction renders it incapable of acting decisively on issues that demand transnational solidarity.

This incompatibility between Islamic ethics and modern nation-states is reflected in the divergent understandings of asylum in Islamic and modern international law. As Moroccan Professor and Attorney Khadija Elmadmad notes,⁶ contemporary refugee law conceives asylum as a sovereign right of the state, with no obligation to grant protection. In contrast, Islamic law regards asylum as a moral and legal imperative that transcends state discretion. The ability of any Muslim, whether individual or ruler, to offer protection affirms the decentralised, communal ethic of Islamic refuge, which stands in stark contrast to the statist logic of border control and national interest.

To be clear, this is not to argue that all Islamic values are inherently incompatible with the modern state. However, values such as transnational solidarity, communal obligation, and moral universality, especially as they relate to vulnerable Muslim populations like the Rohingya or Palestinians, are directly obstructed by the structural imperatives of the nation-state. Historically, such values flourished in periods and contexts where the modern state as we know it did not exist. The failure of the OIC to act decisively, therefore, cannot be attributed solely to a lack of resources or will, but rather to a deeper structural contradiction between its ideological foundations and its institutional configuration.

Conclusion: A Crisis of Purpose 

The OIC was founded to embody the ideals of Islamic solidarity and to act as the collective voice of the Muslim world. More than fifty years later, its record on Palestine demonstrates that it has failed in this mission. Its response has been limited to condemnations, resolutions, and symbolic gestures, while practical action remains absent. Even the extraordinary joint session between the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) held after Israeli strikes on Qatar, while full of rhetoric, did not do anything concrete.⁷

This failure is not accidental but structural. By grounding itself in the framework of nation-states, the OIC has bound itself to the very logic that undermines transnational solidarity. The modern state’s prioritisation of sovereignty, security, and self-interest is fundamentally at odds with the Islamic values of unity and fraternity that the OIC claims to uphold. As a result, the organisation finds itself trapped: unable to abandon its Islamic rhetoric but equally unable to act on it. If the OIC is to remain relevant, it faces a stark choice. It must either transform itself, perhaps into a federative structure that transcends nation-state logic, or candidly revise its objectives, relinquishing its claim to embody Islamic values and accepting its role as a symbolic forum. For Palestinians, and for Muslims worldwide, this means that the promise of a collective pan-Islamic response to oppression remains deferred, if not entirely illusory.

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