Good without God: Understanding the Case of Humanism

The biblical tale of Jacob wrestling with God—or perhaps an angel—serves as a powerful metaphor for the philosophical shifts that have shaped post-Enlightenment Western thought, even though the authenticity of the story may be debated. In the biblical narrative, the man wrestles with the angel throughout the night, unable to overcome him. However, in post-Renaissance philosophies, the narrative shifts: not only does ‘man’ supposedly overcome, but as Nietzsche famously declared, “God is dead… and we have killed him.” This statement reflects the emergence of a humanist worldview, where people are expected to be ‘Good without God.’ This means that with the rise of modern philosophy and science, Europe no longer relied on ‘God’ as the sole arbiter of morality and order. In essence, post-Enlightenment society emerged as one where God is irrelevant, and morality and progress are governed by human reason alone.

Humanists often present this anthropocentric philosophy as a progressive alternative to religion, arguing that humanism fosters a rational and harmonious society free from the conflicts associated with religious dogma. For instance, Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion (2006) and A.C. Grayling in The God Argument (2013) advocate for a humanist approach that emphasises reason and ethics over religious belief. Similarly, Steven Pinker in Enlightenment Now (2018) highlights how enlightenment values of reason, science, and humanism have contributed to societal progress and reduced violence. They assert that religion has historically been a catalyst for conflict, primarily due to the absence of a singular concept of God and the tendency of religious groups to interpret the ‘divine will’ in divergent ways. These differences have fueled historical and ongoing conflicts, as each group claims exclusive knowledge of God’s intentions. In contrast, ‘humanism’ suggests that understanding human desires and intentions can mitigate these disputes more effectively than theological debate. This anthropocentric approach posits that society must shift its focus from interpreting divine will to comprehending human nature and aspirations—a shift that promises to reduce conflict and promote harmony.

This claim rests on two key assumptions: first, that there exists a unified and consensual understanding of what defines ‘Human’; and second, that anthropocentrism fosters societal harmony. However, I argue that there is a fundamental mistake in assuming such a consensus on human nature, desires, and will among western thinkers. In examining this issue, I will highlight how diverse and conflicting interpretations of anthropocentrism reveal the ideological fragmentation within humanism, which is often overlooked in discussions. In this article, I will demonstrate that no singular, consensual definition of ‘Human’ exists, and that this lack of a unified understanding undermines the very concept upon which humanism stands, challenging its claim to promote societal cohesion.

Significance of a Unified Concept

Humanism and its concepts have evolved significantly through the Enlightenment period. Today’s humanism is fundamentally different from earlier interpretations, particularly those within Christianity, which presented an anthropomorphic concept of humanism that was less powerful and comprehensive than its modern counterpart. Modern humanism has its roots in Enlightenment philosophy, particularly in the ideas of thinkers such as Spinoza, Leibniz, Voltaire, Kant, Hegel, Tocqueville, and Marx. Despite their differing philosophies, they all share a central idea: that society should be oriented around humanity and viewed through a human-centric lens. Kant, for instance, argued that relying on external guidance instead of one’s own reason keeps individuals in a state of immaturity.¹ Enlightenment, therefore, is achieved when one relies solely on reason, thus rejecting the need for external assistance.

However, it is often assumed that there is consensus about ‘humanity,’ yet Enlightenment thinkers offer no singular or unified perspective. Each philosopher contributes unique ideas, resulting in a diverse range of interpretations of what it means to be ‘human.’ This diversity, though intellectually enriching, raises significant questions about humanism’s ability to foster societal cohesion. The absence of a unified definition of ‘human’ not only reflects the complexity of human experience but also contributes to the ideological fragmentation that weakens humanism’s coherence.

Scholars like Alasdair MacIntyre, in After Virtue, critique the fragmentation of moral frameworks in modern society, suggesting that this lack of a shared understanding of humanity leads to ethical confusion and social instability.² Similarly, Michel Foucault’s analysis in The Order of Things further reveals that the Enlightenment’s attempt to define ‘man’ was historically contingent, contributing to the eventual “death of man” as a coherent category. Foucault’s notion of the “death of man” refers to the decline of a stable, universal human identity as a result of modernity’s focus on categorization and classification.³ This critique illustrates the fragility of anthropocentrism as a unifying framework, showing that without a stable concept of humanity, any claims to universal human progress or societal harmony are difficult to sustain.

Although Isaiah Berlin argues for value pluralism, recognizing the inevitability of conflicting visions of human nature, this plurality does not necessarily strengthen humanism’s philosophical foundation.⁴ In fact, as seen in the works of Kant, Rousseau, and Hume, the plurality of ideas has contributed to the ideological fragmentation within humanism. For instance, Kant’s emphasis on rational autonomy and moral duty, as articulated in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, sharply contrasts with Rousseau’s belief in humanity’s inherent goodness and the corrupting influence of society, as discussed in The Social Contract. Meanwhile, Hume’s scepticism about the role of reason in guiding human behaviour, presented in A Treatise of Human Nature, further complicates the discourse. Rather than fostering unity, this lack of consensus weakens humanism’s ability to provide a consistent vision for human progress.

Taken together, these scholars’ works highlight the potential problem of fragmentation within humanism. Without a unified understanding of ‘human,’ humanism may struggle to deliver on its promises of rationality, progress, and societal cohesion. The diversity of ideas, while valuable, leaves humanism vulnerable to the same challenges of ideological conflict that it criticises in religious frameworks. In this sense, the absence of a consensual concept of humanity is not a minor issue but a fundamental challenge that undermines the very philosophical coherence and practical viability of humanism.

Man as an ‘Individualist’ vs. ‘Collectivist’

A fundamental distinction in understanding human nature lies in the conception of ‘Man’ as inherently ‘individualistic.’ Mill argues in On Liberty (1859) that “the only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way,” as long as it does not harm others. He further states that “over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign,” emphasising the intrinsic value of autonomy, not only for personal development but also as a cornerstone of a progressive society.

In this view, ‘humanity’ is defined through each individual’s unique capacity for ‘self-determination.’ Humans, as individuals, are considered free and rational beings, endowed with the inherent right to shape their own virtues and destinies. This right to self-determination goes beyond simply choosing between right and wrong; it encompasses the freedom to create one’s own moral framework, independent of any external or predetermined authority. For individualists, ‘autonomy’ is instrumental to the concept of human nature, as it represents the ability of individuals to pursue their own paths to flourishing, free from coercion.

In contrast, the collectivist view posits that ‘humanity’ should be understood through the lens of interconnectedness and community. According to this perspective, a person is not fully ‘human’ upon birth but is rather a ‘potential human.’ While collectivists agree with the concepts of anthropocentrism, freedom, rationality, and progress, they argue that these attributes do not solely belong to the ‘individual.’ Instead, they believe that individuals are born into and shaped by their communities, societies, and collective environments. Each person is a part of a greater whole, and their identity and development are profoundly shaped by this communal context. It is within these settings that a person is nurtured and developed, challenging the notion that freedom, rationality, and progress can be achieved independently of one’s social context.

To illustrate the conflict between individualist and collectivist perspectives, consider language acquisition. Social constructivists like Lev Vygotsky argue that language and cognition develop through social interaction, indicating that thought is limited by one’s linguistic environment.⁵ In contrast, Noam Chomsky asserts that humans are born with an inherent ‘universal grammar,’ suggesting that the capacity for language is a fundamental aspect of human nature.⁶ This juxtaposition highlights the ongoing debate in humanist thought regarding the influence of societal structures versus innate human traits in shaping individuals.

The Fragmentation within Humanism

It is essential to recognize that humanism encompasses a wide range of ideological strands beyond a simple binary of individualism and collectivism. Within individualism, various forms of humanism such as utilitarianism, liberalism, libertarianism, and existentialism exist. Although they all emphasise the importance of individual autonomy while subscribing to humanistic principles, they differ significantly in their approaches. For instance, liberals advocate for state intervention to enhance personal freedom and liberty, whereas libertarians argue for minimal state interference, favouring free markets and personal choice. Existentialists, on the other hand, prioritise individual existence over predetermined essence, asserting the freedom of expression and embracing the idea that life lacks inherent meaning, advocating for unrestricted self-definition.

Similarly, within collectivist thought, debates about the true essence of collectivism have shaped European intellectual history for centuries. Some argue that national identity defines the collective, with debates over whether race or geography is central. Others claim that social class, rooted in economic roles, supersedes national identity. Critics of both perspectives contend that class, race, and nation are exploitative constructs, and that gender, particularly through feminist theory, provides a more genuine collective identity by addressing shared oppression across social divisions. Even fascism, often overlooked as a form of humanism, prioritises the collective identity of a specific group, typically defined by race or nationality. For example, Robert Paxton’s The Anatomy of Fascism (2006) reflects that fascism positions itself as the ultimate expression of societal unity and cohesion, achieved through strict adherence to a shared national or racial identity. This interpretation distorts humanism’s principles by equating the ‘good of humanity’ with the interests of a particular, privileged group, presenting a unique and extreme form of collectivism.

These diverse and conflicting interpretations of anthropocentrism underscore the ideological fragmentation within humanism. This fragmentation has led not only to theoretical disputes but also to tangible conflicts, as seen in the European wars of the 20th century. Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington aptly described this era as the “century of ideological conflict.” Over a span of 30 years during World War I and II, more than 80 million lives were lost, not due to religious differences but because of competing visions of human identity and governance. These wars, as James Kurth emphasises in War, Peace, and the Ideologies of the Twentieth Century, were not merely territorial struggles; they were ideological battles between nationalism, fascism, liberal democracy, and socialism, with each ideology represented by different nations advocating distinct models for human progress and societal organisation. For example, Germany and Italy represented fascism, Russia (later the Soviet Union) represented socialism, and Britain, France, and the United States stood for liberal democracy. Kurth points out how these ideologies were radicalised during key periods of upheaval, such as the Great War and the Great Depression, which intensified the clash over how society should be structured. 

The historical context challenges the humanist claim that religion is the primary driver of conflict and violence. Many today continue to attribute global conflicts—such as those in Palestine, Iraq, or Afghanistan—to religion, neglecting the roles of colonial legacies, political ambitions, and ideological frameworks in shaping these crises. For instance, as Edward Said highlights in The Question of Palestine, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be reduced to religious strife; instead, it is deeply rooted in the legacies of imperialism and colonialism. Said underscores how the British Mandate and the Balfour Declaration created overlapping claims to the same land, fostering competing nationalist movements that have driven the conflict since its inception​.

Similarly, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reflect how humanist ideologies, such as spreading democracy and liberal governance, have been used to justify violence and domination. As Noam Chomsky notes in Hegemony or Survival, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, framed as a mission to promote freedom, was deeply intertwined with geopolitical ambitions and the imposition of Western ideological frameworks, leading to destabilisation and immense human suffering. In Afghanistan, the attempt to impose Western democratic ideals ignored the region’s socio-political realities, exacerbating conflicts rather than resolving them. Drawing on insights from Mahmood Mamdani’s Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, one could argue that ideological interventions, often framed as secular humanist projects, have perpetuated cycles of violence rather than fostering peace.

These examples underscore the need to critically evaluate humanism’s fragmentation and its implications for contemporary global challenges. By understanding the role of anthropocentrism and ideological fragmentation in shaping historical and modern conflicts, we can better address the limitations of humanist assumptions in fostering genuine societal cohesion.

Conclusion

The traditional critique against religion suggests that its diverse interpretations of divinity have fueled human conflict. However, a closer examination reveals that humanism itself suffers from internal divisions. These diverse and conflicting interpretations of anthropocentrism underscore the ideological fragmentation within humanism, which is often overlooked. 

This fragmentation has not only led to theoretical disputes but also to tangible conflicts. Modern history, as James Kurth illustrates in his analysis of 20th-century wars and the Cold War, challenges the humanist claim that a society governed by secular principles would be inherently more peaceful or rational.⁷ This discussion highlights the flaw in the humanist presumption that understanding human desires and intentions can mitigate disputes more effectively than theological debate. Thus, the anthropocentric approach, which posits that society must shift its focus from divine will to comprehending human nature and aspirations, may not deliver the harmony it promises; instead, the fragmented nature of humanism can mirror the very discord it claims to overcome, raising important questions about the viability of secular ideologies in fostering genuine societal cohesion.

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